‘No Boycott of Electoral Politics’ – Jammu Kashmir Latest News | Tourism

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Rekha Chowdhary
In a very recent statement, the newly re-elected President of National Conference, Farooq Abdullah has stated that the NC will not boycott any future election. Regretting his party’s decision to boycott the 2018 Panchayat elections, he has reiterated the point made many a time by Omar Abdullah as well that the party will participate in every coming election. This statement while reflecting the personal response of Farooq Abdullah to the political options before the NC to the emergent political situation, is also representing the response of most of the other Kashmir-based mainstream parties. Despite the severely critical response of the PDP towards the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, Mehbooba Mufti has often made the statement about unconditional willingness of her party to contest Assembly elections, as and when they take place. These parties have come much ahead of the times when ‘boycott’ was a major narrative of Kashmir’s electoral politics and not only the separatists but even the mainstream parties were seen to be using the ‘boycott’ tool to make their political points. And that is an interesting turn in the history of political parties and elections in Kashmir. Boycott is no more a choice and parties have entered a ‘post-boycott’ phase of politics.
Even while it would be interesting to analyse the response of the Kashmir-based mainstream parties towards the electoral process and their keenness to participate in elections, despite their resentment to the August 2019 developments, it might be useful to locate this phenomena in the very colourful and (or should we say blemished!) history of electoral politics of Kashmir.
Broadly speaking, it is through four different phenomenon that the history of electoral politics of Kashmir can be retold – the phenomenon of ‘elections without polling’; the phenomenon when ‘boycott’ was buzzword; the phenomenon of ‘boycott of boycott politics’ and the recent ‘post-boycott politics’.
In the first situation which lasted from 1951 to 1967, there was this peculiar phenomenon of ‘uncontested returns’. Although it was a state-wide phenomenon, but it was more rigorously applied to Kashmir for a longer period of time – only one candidate, mostly belonging to the ruling party would file the nomination paper and would be declared elected without any contest. So massive was this phenomenon in 1951 that in all but two of the total of seventy-five constituencies of J&K Assembly, there were uncontested returns. In Kashmir, of course, hundred percent candidates belonging to the ruling NC were declared elected without any contest. The process continued in the next three elections. In all 43/75, 34/75 and 22/75 candidates in 1957, 1962 and 1967 Assembly elections respectively, were returned uncontested. One could see that most of these uncontested returns were from Kashmir since Jammu region started witnessing a more effective electoral competition after 1951. Even in 1967, fifty percent of the constituencies in Kashmir saw no contest.
The phenomenon of uncontested returns was not without its controversies. All through this period there were allegations that the ruling party (NC led by Sheikh Abdullah till 1953; NC led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed til 1962 and Congress lead by G M Sadiq during 1967 election) had its role in manipulating the opposition and managing uncontested returns. Thus during the 1951 Assembly elections, a large number of nomination papers of the Praja Parishad candidates were rejected on the flimsy grounds, as a result of which the Parishad ‘boycotted’ the elections. During Bakshi’s regime, it was alleged that the opposition parties and candidates were intimidated and the infamous ‘Peace Brigade’ run by his brother so unnerved the opposition candidates that not many in the opposition dared to file the nomination papers. So dismal was the state of affairs that the fact caught national attention and after the 1962 election in an editorial The Hindustan Times raised the question: ‘How then did Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed achieve this happy state of affairs in Kashmir? Is it that the policies of his government are so universally accepted that we might as well replace in his domain the process of election by the process of acclamation?…’ (cited in Balbir Singh’s book State Politics in India: Explorations in Political Processes in Jammu and Kashmir)
The implications of the uncontested returns was very clear, that it not only implied the manipulated democratic processes but clearly pointed out the exclusion of large number of people from the electoral process. One can imagine with the phenomenon of uncontested returns continuing from first to fourth general elections, there was a large population in Kashmir which did not exercise its right to cast its vote for twenty years. No wonder that when democracy was taking root in rest of India, in Kashmir there was no space or role for the common voters. Governments were made or unmade, important policy decisions were being taken but people had no stakes in politics.
The second phenomenon of ‘boycott of electoral politics’ started in the period of militancy and continued unto 2002. This phenomenon basically reflected the boycott of electoral exercise either by the voters or by the political parties. Under the influence of separatists as well as the duress of the militants – Kashmir witnessed situations like the 1989 Parliamentary election when Kashmiri voters mostly boycotted the elections ( Around 5% voter turnout was recorded during this election). Though there was some reasonable voter turnout during the 1996 Assembly election, even so there were constituencies like Amirakadal, Zadibal and Khanyar where less than 13 per cent voter turnout was recorded. In these and other constituencies of Kashmir, the voter turnout was quite dismal during 2002 Assembly elections as well. (Less than 5 % in Zadibal, Khanyar, Idgah, Batmaloo, Habbakadal, Amirakadal and less than 10% in Hazratbal, Sopore, Anantnag and Sonwar constituencies). Such a lower voter turnout was a result not only of the militants’ threat but also of the ‘boycott politics’ followed by the separatists. Ironically, while there was no space for proper electoral campaign by the political parties, the campaign for boycott politics was undertaken by the separatists in a systematic manner. Throughout 1990s till 2002, political parties could not engage in formal campaigning process – there were no rallies, no public meetings and no door-to-door campaign, but separatists indulged in their campaign.
The era of ‘boycott’ politics, interestingly was followed by another trend which can be termed as the one related to ‘Boycotting the Boycott politics’. During various elections after 2002, Kashmiris in general have shunned the boycott politics and even though the separatists (as well as the militants) continued to give call for boycott, people ignored such calls. Thus there was massive voter turnout during various elections held after 2002. 2008 Assembly election was the first such election after 1987 when there was a massive political response of people. Following the role played by the separatists during the Amaranth agitation, the separatist leaders had given a call for boycotting the elections, but people completely ignored the call. Similar call for boycotting elections was ignored during the 2011 Panchayat election which recorded more than 80% voter turnout. The 2014 Assembly election similarly saw a high voter participation. It was the situation of vibrant democratic politics that voters had consciously rejected the separatist call for boycott during 2008-2014 period.
In the light of the above history of electoral politics of Kashmir, the emphatic rejection of ‘boycott politics’ by the parties like NC (and even PDP) can be seen as another phenomenon of electoral politics in Kashmir – the phenomenon of post-boycott politics.
These parties, it may be reminded, have a history of using the idea of ‘boycott’ to put a spotlight to their political position. NC had boycotted the 1996 Parliamentary election protesting the indifferent response of the Centre towards its demand for greater Autonomy. (Having lost out to other parties during this election, it was quick to change its track and participated in the 1996 Assembly elections that took place within months of the Parliamentary elections – and that too without raising any conditions.) In 2018, both NC and PDP boycotted the Panchayat election protesting the lack of assurance by the Centre with regard to Article 35A and Article 370.
As per the new phenomenon, however, these very parties are now taking a public position on the futility of boycott politics. One can try to explain the reasons for this position.
Though the pointlessness of the idea of boycott politics would be abundantly clear to any political party seeking to make a mark in the competitive politics, but in the situation in which the Kashmir-based parties have been placed in the post-August 2019 situation – the idea becomes much more precarious. Having lost the core logic of their politics in the wake of abrogation of the special constitutional status of J&K, these parties have been seeking to find their relevance in Kashmir’s politics. As the new parties and political actors have emerged on the scene and have been aggressively seeking an opportunity to take advantage of the changed context of politics – these traditional parties can’t afford to withdraw from the scene. That is the reason that despite the expectations of their boycott during the DDC elections in 2021, these parties participated. And since the DDC election, these parties particularly the NC, is not only showing its keenness to participate in elections but also showing its flexibility in doing so. Its willingness to participate in elections is without any pre-conditions – whether related to Article 370 or even restoration of the statehood.
(Feedback welcome at rekchowdhary@gmail.com)



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